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CHINA’S STOCK MARKET has developed rapidly since it was founded ten
years ago. The companies listed on this stock market are the modern Chinese firms,
representing a new enterprise system in China.  However, the features of the these
Chinese public listed companies (PLCs) largely remain unknown.  This paper
examines the shareholding structures of these Chinese modern firms and finds a non-
monotonic impact of government shareholding on corporate value.
Using the method of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (LLS, 1999), this
paper documents the ultimate shareholding structures of firms listed on the Chinese
stock market.  The separation of cash flow rights and voting rights through pyramids
and cross-shareholding is found to be marginal, but the control is highly concentrated
in China.  Furthermore, it is found that the government is the majority shareholder of
31.4% of the PLCs.  This paper therefore suggests that, compared with western firms,
the key to understanding these Chinese modern firms is the role of the government
shareholder.  This paper is devoted to studying the impact of state shareholding on
corporate value.
The data used in this paper is the ownership, accountancy and share price data
of all the firms listed on the Shanghai Securities Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange.  With this panel dataset of 2660 firm-year observations, this paper finds
that mixed enterprises
1 are valued lower than the enterprises without any government
shareholding stakes and the firms under the control of the government shareholder are
valued lower than those firms under the control of the a non-government shareholder.
The overall impact of state shareholding is negative on corporate value in China’s
PLCs.  It is consistent with the literature of inefficiency of state ownership
2.
Following the research approach of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and
McConnell and Servaes (1990)
3, this paper, however, does not find a monotonicWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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negative relationship between the sizes of government shareholding stakes and
corporate value.  It is found a U-shaped relationship with a higher left end than the
right end between state shareholding and the value of firms.  In other words, when the
government is a small shareholder, corporate value decreases with increased sizes of
the government shareholding stakes.  This is consistent with the grabbing hand
hypothesis of the government shareholder.  When the shareholding stake of the
government is sufficiently large, corporate value is higher in the firms with a larger
stake of government shareholding.  It suggests that the government shareholder has a
helping hand as well.
This paper interprets this U-shape with the organizational view of the
government.  That is, the government shareholder acts on maximizing its utility
functions.  To maximize both its political interests and financial interests, the
government shareholder provides both the grabbing and helping hands to the firms.
With increased control rights of the government shareholder, the probability and the
extent of the expropriation of the government shareholder increases and corporate
value decreases until a certain threshold.  When the cash flow rights of the
government shareholder are sufficiently large, the government, however, has no
incentives to continue to increase the magnitude of its predation in this firm.  In
contrast, with a large shareholding stake, the government shareholder offers a helping
hand to these firms. Because of its financial interest based on corporate profits, the
large government shareholder has incentives to improve corporate value for the
residual cash flows by monitoring the managers and providing preferential treatments.
This paper makes an attempt to provide support to this interpretation, with studying
employee-welfare expense, board-member turnovers and explicit government
subsidies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
3
By documenting the shareholding structure of Chinese firms, this paper
contributes to the map of ownership structures around the world (LLS 1999,
Claessens et al. 2000 and Faccio and Lang 2000).  Furthermore, with the initiative on
studying a particular shareholder the government, this study contributes to the
knowledge of the impacts of shareholding structures on firm value (Shleifer and
Vishny 1997).  With the evidence from China, this paper consolidates the static mix-
enterprises literature (e.g. Boardman and Vining 1989) and the dynamic privatization
literature (e.g. Megginson et al. 1994).  More importantly, examining the influence of
state shareholding as well as some other corporate finance factors, this paper helps to
understand the firms on the Chinese stock market.
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section I describes the dataset and documents
the shareholding structures of the firms on China￿s stock market.  Section II reviews
the state ownership literature and describes testable hypotheses.  The econometric
methods are presented in Section III.  Section IV presents the empirical findings of
the impact of government shareholding.  Section V interprets the U-shape finding and
provides further evidences.  Section VI concludes this paper.
I. Shareholding Structures and Corporate Features
This section introduces the data sample from the Chinese stock market,
documents the shareholding structures of these PLCs and discusses some other
characteristics of these firms.  It is found that the government shareholder in control is
a main characteristic of the Chinese PLCs.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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A. China’s stock market and data sample
The Chinese stock market is composed of the Shanghai Securities Exchange
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which started operation in
December 1990 and July 1991, respectively
4.  The regulatory authority is the China
Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), founded in October 1992.  It stipulates
disclosure rules and governance regulations.
The Chinese stock market has grown rapidly.  Between 1992 and 1998, the
market capitalization increased at the average rate of 84.7% per year.  At the end of
1998, the total market capitalization was about a quarter of China’s GDP.  The
number of listed companies grew 62.0% annually, from 53 PLCs in 1992 to 851 PLCs
in 1998.
The data used in this paper is based on the audited annual reports from the
PLCs and share price data from the stock exchanges.  Internationally, the leading data
vender is the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), but the TEJ database has a large
number of missing values.  The domestic investment bankers and security analysts
tend to use the Genius database.  A new dataset was therefore been assembled based
on these two databases and several other complementary sources (see appendix 1).
This newly assembled dataset covers the accounting information, the holding stakes
of large shareholders and daily share prices from 1994 to 1998.   The regulatory
framework is relatively consistent during this period
5.  The description of corporate
features and mapping of the ownership structures are based on the most recent data of
1998.
My data sample excluded fund management companies, as their operations are
distinctly different from industrial firms
6.  It also excluded the firms that do not issue
shares for domestic investors
7.  The sample used to examine the relationship betweenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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state shareholding and corporate value includes 287 companies in 1994, 311 in 1995,
517 in 1996, 719 in 1997 and 826 in 1998.  Altogether, the main dataset used in this
paper have 2660 firm-year observations.
B. Corporate characteristics of Chinese PLCs
A simplified aggregate balance sheet of my data sample is presented in Table
II and the following briefly describes the features of these modern Chinese firms.
B.1 Leverage
Table II shows that the ratio of total liability to total asset, is 49%.  The debt to
total asset ratio is 21%.  Debt finance in PLCs is mainly in the form of loans, as the
market of corporate bonds does not exist.  Overall, China￿s PLCs are not heavily
indebted.  The average current ratio of quoted companies is 2.0 and quick ratio 1.5,
indicating that their liquidity is generally adequate.  This is different from these
government-solely-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China.
B.2 Size
The average total asset of China’s PLCs was US$ 180 million and the average
fixed asset was $50 million
8; 53% of total assets was current assets and 36% was
fixed assets.  The average net asset per share was 0.31 US dollar and the average
earning per share was 0.025 US dollar in 1998.
B.3 Age
The listed companies have an average age of 14 years and the median is 7
years.  Most of the listed companies are newly formed or restructured during the
reform period of China.  They are different from the SOEs, most of which were
founded under the former central planning system.
B.4 GovernanceWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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 The corporate governance structure of these Chinese companies is, in essence,
the one-tier board structure.
9   At the shareholders’ annual general meeting, the Board
of Directors is elected.  The board of directors appoints the general manager, approves
the annual accounts and corporate strategy.  They monitor corporate management and
have the power to intervene if necessary.  Like the CEO in the United States, the
general manager is in charge of the daily operation.
B.5 Managerial shareholding
The top management team can also be the shareholders of the company, but
the shares held by the managers and directors are not allowed to be transferred during
their tenure.  The managerial shareholdings are required to be disclosed to the public.
Under the constraints of personal wealth in China, the average managerial ownership
was as small as 0.005% of the total shares.
C. Shareholding structures of Chinese quoted firms
The above section shows that the Chinese PLCs are organized and operated
under the model of the modern western firms.   However, the shareholding strucutres
of the Chinese PLCs are somewhat particular.  This section first describes the official
classification of shares and argues that it is confused with tradability and ownership.
Then presented is the ultimate ownership structure of China’s PLCs under the
methodology of LLS (1999) is presented
10.
 In the Chinese stock market, share ownership is officially classified by and
reported as state, legal-person, employee, and tradable-A shares, and shares
denominated in a foreign currency.  Although there are multiple classes of stocks in
these Chinese PLCs, all the common shares bear the same rights for voting and cash
flow.  The one-share-one-vote rule is followed in all the PLCs with all the shares.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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The above classification was to facilitate the regulation of the trading activities
rather than classifying the investors.  It is confused institutional shareholders with
legal-person shares, and confuses foreign shareholders with the shares denominated in
foreign currency.  However, most of the existing research on the impact of
shareholding structures on corporate value in China￿s quoted companies (Xu and
Wang 1999, Qi et al. 2000) use this classification.
This paper follows the cutting-off methods of LLS  (1999) and Franks and
Meyer (2000) to document the ultimate shareholding structures of these Chinese
firms.  This method traces down the ultimate shareholder with a holding larger than a
certain threshold
11 by examining pyramids, cross-shareholdings and reciprocal
shareholdings.  For example, the 10% threshold traces only the ultimate shareholders
that hold more than 10% of the company
12.  A pyramid is defined as an entity that
owns one public listed company, which in turn owns another corporation, as so on.
Cross-shareholdings are defined as a condition that exists when a company has a
controlling shareholder and owns shares in a firm that belongs to its chain of control.
Reciprocal shareholding is the case that a company owns part of itself.  The
calculations of ultimate shareholding rights is based on the lowest holding rights in
the chain to trace the ultimate shareholders.
In China, the sizes of the shareholding stakes of the largest ten shareholders
are requested to be released to the public.  Based on the names of 846 PLCs and the
ten largest shareholders in 1998, it was found that there is another quoted company
among the ten largest shareholders of 167 companies.  However, even by the minimal
threshold of 10%, only 19 firms are pyramids or cross-shareholdings.  That is, there
were only 19 cases where an ultimate shareholder holds this company more than 10%
through another quoted company.  Meanwhile, this paper found that, by the 10%William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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cutting-off level, the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights was 99% and thus the
separation of ownership and control is marginal
13.
Panel A in Table IV summarizes the shareholding fractions of the ultimate
owners who is the largest shareholder, or owns larger than 50%, 30% or 10% of
voting equity in my data sample of 846 quoted companies in 1998.  The government
shareholder is the largest shareholder of 44% of the sampled PLCs and the majority
shareholder of 31% of the sampled PLCs.  If 30% of voting shares is taken as the
threshold for control, the government controls 38% of the sampled PLCs.  If 10% of
voting shares is taken as the threshold for control, the government controls 44% of the
sampled PLCs.  Comparing with the findings in developed economies
14, the
government shareholder in control is a salient feature of these Chinese firms.  It is
mandatory to understand the impact of government shareholding in order to
understand these modern Chinese firms.
There is no individual or household family owning more than 10% of the
shares in a Chinese PLC.  It is actually stipulated by the government that no single
individual investment account is allowed to hold more than 0.5% of one PLC.  Thus a
rich family has to disguise itself as a private joint-stock company and then this
company may hold a large block of shares in a PLC, for example, Xinfu Shiye.  The
cases of disguised large family shareholders are, however, very few.
15
The Chinese government holds the majority stakes of more than 30% of
companies.  If we assume that the largest shareholder is in control of a company, then
the government controls 44% of quoted firms through its shareholdings.  State
shareholding is a salient feature of these Chinese firms
16.
Panel B in Table IV shows a highly concentrated ownership structure.  On
average, the five largest shareholders account for 60.6% of the total outstandingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
9
shares, compared with 25.4% in United States and 33.1% in Japan (Prowse 1998).
More strikingly, the largest shareholder holds more than 40% of the equity in these
Chinese PLCs.   It is consistent with the institutional underpinning, as the weak legal
protection of investors demand a concentrated shareholding structure (LLSV 1998).
The above analysis shows that the control of the government shareholder is
substantial in the PLCs, which features the Chinese socialist characteristics.
Therefore, a main difference of these Chinese modern firms from western modern
firms is the significant large shareholding rights of the government.  Understanding
the impacts of the government shareholder is imperative to understand China￿s PLCs.
D. State shareholding in Chinese firms
State shareholding is calculated as the proportion of state-owned shares to
total shares.  State-owned shares are the shares directly owned by the government or
its wholly-owned economic institutions.  The government is composed of the central
government and local governments, but the heads of the local governments are
normally assigned by the central government in China.  The central government is
essentially the owner of state-owned shares.  The senior staff of the holding
institutions of state-shares are government functionaries.  The bureaucrats managing
state shares differentiate the government shareholder from other shareholders.
Government functionaries serve the governmental interests to collect revenues from
corporate operation and reallocate resources for political purpose.
OECD (2000) concludes that even the Chinese government￿s newly
established holding companies continue to be more bureaucratically, rather than
commercially, oriented.  In case branches of the central government or local
governments directly hold the state shares, the influences of bureaucrats are moreWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
10
obvious.  Given that the state-shares are managed and controlled under the
government bureaucratic hierarchy, this paper actually studies the impact of
bureaucracy shareholding
17.
For example, the government holds 88.6% in the firm Qinggong Machinery
18.
The other shareholders in Qinggong Machinery are family investors and some
township-village enterprises.  The government￿s agent that controls this shareholding
is the Shanghai Electronics Group which is fully owned by the state and operated like
a department of the Shanghai Municipal Government.  The mayor of Shanghai
government and his management committee, who is assigned by the central
government in Beijing, decides the appointment of the general managers in both the
Shanghai Electronics Group and the Qinggong Machinery.  Appendix 2 shows the
organizational structure of the regional state-shareholding management system in
Shanghai City.  It suggests that state shares have one ultimate owner.
E. Corporate value and profitability
This section introduces the proxies of corporate value and presents the
descriptive statistics pertaining to the relationship between state shareholding and
corporate value.
Tobin￿s Q (Lindenberg and Ross 1981) is an adjusted measure of the market
value of the firm.  This paper uses the simplified version of Tobin’s Q (Perfect and
Wiles 1994; Chung and Pruitt 1994) as the substitute for the actual Tobin￿s Q
19.  This
simplified Tobin’s Q, heneforth known as Q, is the sum of market value of equity and
book value of debt over book value of total assets.  It has been widely adopted in
corporate finance literature to avoid the arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and
inflation rates (e.g. Shin and Stulz, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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To be cautious with the market efficiency issue in China, another measure of
corporate performance is needed.  The value of a firm is decided by its profitability.
Following conventions of corporate finance literature, return on assets (ROA) is used
as the proxy for profitability;  ROA equals the net earnings divided by the total assets.
To understand the relationship between state shareholding and corporate
value, Table V presents Q and ROA in the firms under the 10% percentile distribution
of the size of state shareholding stakes.  About one third of companies have no state
shareholding and their profitability seems to be selective to that of other companies
high.  Then, as the stake of state shareholding increases, corporate value seems to
decrease.  This trend reverses once state shareholding reaches about 40%.  Finally,
when state shareholding is in the 80% to 90% range, corporate value again seems to
decrease.   However, there are few firms in this range and this simple statistics can be
highly influenced by outliers.  It needs rigorous econometric investigations.
II. Literature of State Ownership and Hypotheses
The government is the largest shareholder of these Chinese companies.  This
section briefly reviews the literature of government ownership and proposes testable
propositions about state shareholding.
A. Detrimental government ownership
The property rights theory argues that the fatal flaw of SOEs the state fully
owned enterprises is the principal-agent problem.  Because of information
asymmetry and incentive incompatibility, agency problems surface when the owner
cannot operate the firm itself and has to delegate the control to the managers.  The
managers in SOEs, therefore, have no incentive to maximize corporate profitability.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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However, among the public listed firms that are large and publicly financed, the
separation of ownership and control is a common feature
20, regardless of whether or
not the government is a shareholder.  Stiglitz (1994) argues that "￿ the nature of
those principal-agent problems may differ little depending on whether ownership is
public [state] or private."  This principal-agent problem does not necessarily suggest
the inefficiency of government shareholding in the PLCs.
Another flaw of state ownership is political interference (Kornai 1980, 1992).
This applies to the partial state ownership in the large modern firms.   Based on the
voting rights from holding shares, the government can interfere with corporate
management. Ideally, a government tries to improve total social welfare rather than
corporate profitability.  In reality, the government pursues its political interests
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994).  The politicians through the control rights of state
shareholding may deliberately transfer resources of firms to their political supporters
(Shleifer and Vishny 1998).  These would normally be at the expense of corporate
profitability (Shapiro and Willig 1992, Boycko et al. 1996).
The empirical literature of state ownership can be classified into the dynamic
and static approach.  Much of this literature supports the theoretical view that state
ownership is detrimental to corporate value.  Comparing corporate performance
before and after privatization, the dynamic approach finds that reducing or eliminating
state ownership improves corporate performance and concludes that therefore the
government ownership is generally detrimental (e.g. Megginson et al 1994).  The
studies that have compared state-fully-owned enterprises, mixed enterprises and
private enterprises over the same period are static.  Although their samples of mixed
enterprises are small, most of these studies find that private enterprises outperform
mixed enterprises and state-fully-owned enterprises (eg. Boardman and Vining 1989),William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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and thus the static research also suggests that government shareholding is detrimental
to corporate profitability.
B. Testable hypotheses
Based on the grabbing hand view of government ownership (Shleifer and
Vishny 1998), the following hypotheses are developed.
Hypothesis 1: The companies with partial state ownership are valued lower than
those without any state ownership.
State shareholding provides the channel for the government to intervene
corporate management
21 for its political purpose.  The firms without partial state
ownership should have less political interference and therefore higher value.
Hypothesis 2: The companies in which a government is the controlling shareholder
are valued lower than those with a non-government controlling shareholder.
Corporate value possibly depends on whether the government shareholder is
able to stay in control of the management team.  This hypothesis develops the first
hypothesis within the context of joint-stock companies.  
Hypothesis 3: Corporate value is a negative function of the voting rights of the
government shareholder.
This hypothesis further develops the detrimental view of the government that
is a shareholder.  The power and influence of a shareholder is based on its voting
rights.  With increasing influence of the government shareholder, and therefore the
probability and magnitude of political interference, corporate value should decrease.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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III. Econometric Models and Predications
To test the above hypotheses, this section first describes the investigation
procedures and the related econometric models.  The choice of control variables are
also discussed here.   In addition, it briefly describes the robustness tests performed.
A. Econometric methods
The econometric investigations begin with comparison analyses and then
focus on regression analyses. Student-t statistics were used to examine the differences
between means.  In order to control for the outliers effect, the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U tests to investigate the significance of median difference were also
performed.  As for the regression analyses, the tables report the results of the pooled
ordinary linear regressions adjusted by White robust estimators (OLS) and the
maximum log likelihood panel data estimation (MLP).
OLS estimation with the robust standard errors produces consistent standard
errors even if the data is weighted or the residuals are not independently distributed.
The F-statistics and R-squared are similar to the standard OLS estimations.  With the
concern about outliers, the least-absolute value models (MAD models) were also
performed to estimate the medians.  Since the results of both techniques are similar,
the result of MAD models are therefore not presented.
MLP models estimate the cross-sectional time series data.  The MLP model
provides the random-effects estimator, which counts for both the individual-specific
effects and time-specific effects.  The panel-data model has been used to resolve or
reduce the magnitude of a potential econometric problem that omitted variables are
correlated with explanatory variables. More importantly, the MLP model uses both
the within and the between information and captures the over-time information.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Mundlak (1978) argues that the individual effects should be always treated as random.
Moreover, ranging from 287 firms in 1994 to 826 firms in 1998, the unbalanced panel
dataset is wide and longitudinal.  In addition, the results of Baltagi-Li LM tests also
support the assumption of random effects.  The maximum log likelihood estimation of
the MLP model is consistent and asymptotically efficient for my data
22.   Therefore,
the following model is estimated
it i it it x y ε ν β α + + + =
by maximizing the log likelihood of the ith unit
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This paper mainly reports the results of the polynominal forms of independent
variables.
23  The polynomial regressions are under the assumption that the relationship
between state shareholding and corporate value is non-linear.  The piecewise
regressions were also performed and the results support the conclusion of this paper.
For conciseness, they are not reported here.
The investigation starts from the univariate analysis which is free of the
multicollinearity problem.  Then it is control for identified spurious effects.
B. Control variables
To deal with the possibility that a variety of factors can jointly affect state
ownership and corporate value and thus induce a spurious correlation between them,
multivariate analyses are performed with controlling for a set of factors.  Based on
both the conventions in the corporate finance literature and the Chinese institutional
backgrounds, this paper uses corporate size, asset structure, capital structure, firm age,
as well as stock exchange, industrial sector and year dummies as the control variables.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Table VI presents the definitions and the predicated signs of the variables used in this
paper.
B.1 Shareholding structures
The shareholding structures influence both the distributions of government
shareholding and corporate value.  Four ownership control variables are chosen.
Gomes and Novaes (1999) argue that in the presence of a second large owner, the
actions of the controlling shareholder are monitored and this contains tunneling of
corporate wealth.  It predicts that the second largest owner is associated with a high
market value.  The dummy variable of Second is defined as whether or not there is a
second shareholder having more than 10% stake in a firm.  As for the enterprises
without government shareholding, whether a large shareholder exists influences
corporate governance and value.  The dummy variable of LargePrivate is therefore
created by whether there is a major non-government shareholder in the private
enterprise.   The Herfindhal index of the ten largest shareholders is a proxy of the
shareholding concentration.  It is used to control for the shareholding structures when
comparing mixed enterprises with private enterprises by the dummy variable
regressions.  However, the Herfindahal index is seriously correlated to the equity
stakes of the government.  It has to be left out when state shareholding is an
explanatory variable.  Morck et al (1988) show the influence of managerial ownership
on Tobin￿s Q.  The fourth ownership-related control variable Manager is used to
control for the shares held by the top management team.
B.2 Size
With regard to economic fundamentals, large-sized firms may have scale
economies and better access to bank credits, which could improve corporate
profitability (Chhibber and Majumdar 1999).  On the other hand, large enterprisesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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often have the government having a relatively high equity stake.  Size also has an
effect on the relation between state shareholding and corporate value.  It needs to be
controlled in the regression models.
B.3 Tangibility
The asset structure or the assets￿ tangibility influences firms￿ growth and
corporate valuation.  The Chinese government tends to hold larger percentages in the
enterprises with a higher proportion of fixed assets.  Meanwhile, corporate value of
these companies is affected by their capital intensity.  This may introduce a spurious
effect on the correlation between state shareholding and corporate value.  The
tangibility ratio also helps to identify the growth potential of a company.
24
Tangibility is approximated by the fixed asset ratio that is calculated as the net fixed
assets divided by total assets
25.
B.4 Leverage
Another basic firm characteristic is capital structure.  Titman and Wessels
(1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that capital structure is correlated to ROA
and market-to-book value.  Kornai (1980) argues that the enterprises with state
ownership have a soft budget constraint￿they can borrow as much as they want
without the worry of financial distress or bankruptcy.  The cost of financial distress is
therefore relatively low in China where soft budget constraints exist.  The static
tradeoff story of debts between tax shield and cost of financial distress is perhaps
dominated by the benefits of debts in the PLCs.  This predicates that corporate value
is a positive function of gearing ratio of debts.  The gearing ratio is measured as total
liabilities over total asset in the reported tables.  Other forms of leverage ratios were
tested and similar results were obtained.
B.5 AgeWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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A firm has its life cycle and the age of a firm is related to corporate
profitability and market value.  Meanwhile, firm ages are correlated to state
shareholding.  Old firms have higher state shareholding, which is consistent with the
path dependence theory.  Firm age needs to be controlled.
B.6 Industries
Both state shareholding and corporate value vary across industries.  The true
relationship between state shareholding and corporate value can be hidden by
industry-specific shocks.  Schmalensee (1985) shows that accounting rates at the
business-unit level are strongly influenced by industries and Wernerfelt and
Montgomery (1988) find that industrial effects account for the majority of the
explained variance of Tobin￿s Q.  It is mandatory to control for industrial shocks.
There are two kinds of industrial classifications for Chinese PLCs.  One is the five-
industry code: manufacturing, trade, utility, real estate and conglomerates.  It is used
by most existing studies on Chinese PLCs (for example, Xu and Wang 1999), but the
industry effects cannot be well captured by this over-simplified industry classification
(Chen and Jiang 2000).  The other is a two digit standard industrial classification as
21-industry-code.  Adopting this two-digit industrial classification is a significant
technical feature of this study.  The coefficients of the 21 industrial dummies are not
reported in the tables, because they make the tables cumbersome but does not add
value for the empirical conclusions.
B.7 Stock exchange
  The data used in this paper is from companies listed on two stock exchanges￿
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Due to historical and
geographic reasons, the distributions of state shareholding between two stockWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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exchanges are not exactly the same.  The dummy of Exchange is the proxy of the
stock-exchange specific noise.  It has value 1, if the firm is traded in Shanghai.
B.8 Time dummies
Year dummies are also used, because they can capture the rapid institutional
changes and macroeconomic shocks in different years.
C. Robustness tests
In order to be cautious about the proxies of corporate value, other measures of
corporate performance were tested, including Excess Value, Return on Sales, Return
on Equity, Net Margin and Return on Capital Employed.  The results support the
findings based on Tobin’s Q and ROA.
Specifying the model with control variables carefully follows the corporate
finance literature.   Further, more sensitivity tests are performed by adjusting the set
of control variables; for example, by adding the sales-growth ratio and removing the
tangibility ratio.  The results are consistent with the reported tables.  This study also
considered the potential nonlinerity of the control variables and included their squared
forms or cubic forms doing sensitivity analyses, but most of nonlinear forms of
control variables tend to have insignificant coefficients.  The signs for the
independent variables remained the same with different sets of control variables.
The analyses crosschecked the potentially undue influence of outliers on the
empirical results. Firstly, the median regressions performed are consistent with the
results reported in the tables.  Secondly, the results in the tables are robust if the Hadi
dummies are added to capture the multiple outliers in the multivariate analysis.
Thirdly, the DFITS test suggests that the regressions reported are generally fine.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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IV. Empirical Findings
This section applies the econometric tools described in Section III to the three
propositions from Section II.  It compares corporate values of different groups of
firms and then examines the continuous relationship between state shareholding and
corporate value.  The endogeneity issue is also verified in this section.
A. Overall impacts
The econometric investigations start by comparing the performance among
companies with different sizes of state shareholding.  The enterprises are classified
into: 1) mixed enterprises (ME) and private enterprises (NSE)
26; 2) the enterprises
whose largest shareholder is the government (SL) and those with the non-government
shareholder as the largest shareholder (NSL); 3) the enterprises where the majority
shareholder is the government (Smaj) and those with the non-government majority
shareholder (NSmaj).
The so-called private enterprises on the stock market are actually the
enterprises without state shares (NSEs).  The owners of these enterprises include both
institutions and families.  The enterprises with state shareholding more than 0% but
less than 100% are termed as the mixed enterprises (MEs).  In a firm with some state
assets, the managers may feel obliged to serve for the state interest in this communist
country or, more realistically, they may use it as a shield of managerial agency costs.
Moreover, if there are some shares of the state, the government sends its
representatives to the board of directors.   The government therefore somehow
accesses the inside information.
27  Whether or not there is a government shareholder
decides whether or not the government can influence the actions of the managers.
Table VII finds that NSE significantly perform better than ME.  The mean of the Q inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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NSEs is 19% higher than that in MEs, and ROA 18% higher.   This supports
Hypothesis 1 in Section II that the firms without partial government ownership
perform worse.
Another way to examine the overall influence of the government shareholder
is to categorize the firms into those with the government as the largest shareholder
and those with a non-government shareholder as the largest shareholder.  The
shareholder holding the largest stake is often the controlling shareholder, as there are
few instances of collusion of other shareholders to counter the largest shareholder in
China.
28  Table VII finds that the enterprises which have the government as the largest
shareholder have a significantly higher value and profitability than those where a non-
government shareholder holds the largest share of equity.  If the government is the
largest shareholder, Tobin’s Q decreases 14% and ROA decreases 12%.
This paper further groups firms by whether the majority shareholder is the
government.  Holding more than 50%, the majority shareholder has the absolute
control.  The impact of other shareholders on corporate value is significantly reduced.
Table VII finds that Q is 2.5 and ROA 5.4% with the majority government
shareholder, while Q 3.0 and ROA 7.4% where the majority shareholder is not the
government.  This is consistent with hypothesis 2 which states that firms under the
control of the government shareholder perform worse.
There is certainly a concern that state shareholding and corporate value of the
firms may be correlated through other factors.  Table VII also compares corporate
features of the firms.  It finds that corporate characteristics vary according to the
existence and influence of the government shareholder. Thus taking the different
types of enterprises as dummy variables, multivariate regression analyses are
requested to perform.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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The robust OLS and MLP multivariate regressions are presented in Table VIII.
This table confirms that the enterprises without a government shareholder perform
better than the enterprises with a government shareholder, and that the enterprises in
which the government is the largest shareholder perform better than those in which a
non-government entity is the largest shareholder.
29
The enterprises with a majority shareholder have highly concentrated
shareholding structure and thus it has to be regressed without the control variable of
Herfindhal in order to prevent the serious multi-collinearity problem.   It is also found
that the enterprises with a non-government majority shareholder are valued higher
than enterprises with the government as the majority shareholder.  This result, which
is consisted with those presented in Table VIII, is not reported in the tables due to
spaces.
Tables VII and VIII jointly approve Hypothesis 1 and 2.  With regard to
corporate value, state shareholding does matter and the government shareholding is,
on the whole, detrimental.  With the first large sample of mixed enterprises
30, this
paper finds that private enterprises perform better than mixed enterprises. This
conclusion is consistent with the empirical finding of Boardman and Vining (1989)
and consolidates this stream of literature with a large sample of mixed enterprises.
Further, this finding corroborates the dynamic privatization studies, to some extent
31.
Table VIII also shows the impacts of other corporate features on corporate
characteristics, which is discussed in Section V.C.
B. U-shaped relationship
To examine Hypothesis 3 that corporate value is a negative linear function of
the voting rights of the government shareholder, this study regresses corporate valueWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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on the simple form of state shareholding in mixed enterprises.   However, whether in
the univariate or the multivariate analysis, there is not a significant relationship
between corporate value and the simple form of state shareholding.  The followings
are the equations on the finding with the simple form of State in the multivariate
analysis.
(0.096) (0.012) (0.000) (0.040)
115 0 005 0 383 . 1 436 0
(0.000) (0.665) (0.000) ) 011 (0. (0.169) (0.000)
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LR chi2 = 422.29,  Prob > chi2 =  0.000, P-values in parenthesis. (1)
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+ + + − + − =
   LR chi2 = 799.20,  Prob > chi2 =  0.000, P-values in parenthesis.        (2)
The coefficients of State in equation 1 and 2 are not significant.  Hypothesis 3
is therefore rejected.  The government shareholder is not linearly incrementally
detrimental with increase in state shareholding from small to large.  The impact of
government shareholding in the Chinese context is not fully consistent with the
literature of state ownership.
However, Table V with descriptive statistics suggests some pattern for the
relationship between state shareholding and corporate value.  Hence, the paper further
examines the continuous relationship between these two variables using spline
regressions.   It was found that both Q and ROA significantly decrease till a certain
threshold and then significantly increase with the increased size of stateWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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shareholdings.  However, the results depend on the choice of the spline knots.  The
relationship is therefore examined and reported with the polynomial regressions.
Table IX shows that there is a highly significant non-monotonic relationship
between state shareholding and corporate value.
The multivariate MLP estimated equations are written down as follows:
(0.135) (0.023) (0.000) (0.025)
102 0 005 0 389 1 474 0
(0.000) (0.602) (0.000) ) 005 (0. (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
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− + + + + − =
LR chi2 = 438.14,  Prob > chi2 =  0.000, P-values in parenthesis. (3)
(0.854) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
001 0 0003 0 169 . 0 033 0
(0.000) (0.018) (0.006) ) 265 (0. (0.039) (0.018) (0.000)
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+ + + − + − − =
LR chi2 =  727.60, Prob > chi2 =  0.000, P-values in parenthesis. (4)
The coefficient of State  is significantly negative and that of 
2 State  is
significantly positive.  This means the statistic relationship between state shareholding
and corporate value looks like the following stimulated chart:
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The firms are valued lower when the shareholding stake of the government is
higher, but, after a certain threshold, corporate value increases with the size of state￿s
shareholding stakes.  Using a back-of-envelope calculation, it is found that the turning
points are relatively stable in the 30~40% range of government shareholding,
depending on the model specification.  It is called a U-shaped pattern with a higher
left end than the right end.
In contrast to the theory which suggested that state ownership leads to
inefficiency, the actual impact of state shareholding on corporate value is profound.
The negative relationship between state shareholding and corporate value before a
certain threshold suggests that a small government shareholder is incrementally
detrimental.  The positive relationship between state shareholding and corporate value
after a certain threshold suggests that a large government shareholder is incrementally
beneficial.
C. Endogeneity issue
Section IV.B. finds that there is a U-shaped pattern between state shareholding
and corporate value.   The reason may be that the amount of state shares is the choice
of the government based on corporate profitability and value.  Does corporate value
cause the distribution of state shareholding?   This section discusses the endogeneity
issue of the U-shaped finding and examines whether corporate value causes the
distribution of state shareholding.
If there exists a certain causality from corporate value to state shareholding, it
can happen through three channels.  The first is IPOs or initial public offerings.  The
government shareholder may sell more shares in the enterprises that have higher
profitability.  This assumes that the government targets at raising revenue from sellingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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state ownership in enterprises.  If so, as the offer prices are normally strongly
correlated to corporate profitability, the causality can run from profitability to the
change of state shareholding in the initial public offering process.   The second
channel is SEOs or seasoned equity offerings.  After the IPOs, the government may
increase its shareholding based on the firm￿s profitability.  The third channel is the
market for partial stake transfer, since the government is forbidden from participation
in the open market by law.   The change of state shareholding in these three processes
may be based on corporate value.
Timely-ordering is a necessary condition of causality.  The paper further tests
whether the past distribution of corporate profitability is correlated to the change of
state shareholding stakes.  The following equation was achieved.
(0.329)     (0.032)
ε 1 * 559 . 0 062 . 0 + + − − = Industries ROA e StateChang
F-statistics=27.47           R-squared=0.145                 P-values in parenthesis. (5)
The signs of  1 − ROA  keep insignificant when the model specifications are
changed with more control variables.  Statistically, if there is no correlation, and
hence there cannot be causality.  That is, historical corporate performance does not
cause the distribution of state shareholding.
It is consistent with the Chinese reality that liquidation of the government￿s
equity stake in a company does not target at raising fiscal revenue
32.  The ideology of
the communist party dominates the financial interest of the government in the IPOs.
The goal of selling part of state ownership is aimed at restructuring enterprises
33.
With regard to SEOs, the central government encourages its agents that
directly hold state shares to maintain the former position in corporate control, but it
does not allocate the sufficient budgets for the season equities.  Therefore, theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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purchase of seasoned shares is decided not by corporate profitability, but by the
budgetary constraints of the agents holding state shares.  In practices, the controlling
rights of the government shareholder are normally diluted during SEOs.
As for the block transfer of state shares, it is also targeted at enterprise
restructuring.  There are a number of cases wherein the government to grant its shares
to strategic investors
34.  For example, the government gave for free its shares in
Tianjin Meilun to Tianjin Taida Group Co. in 1997.  Securities Times (2000) found
that the state-shares transfers, including both grant transfers and negotiated transfers,
usually aims at injection of new capital into the company and updating its technology
rather than raising revenue for the government.
Thus corporate value does not cause the distribution of state shareholding.
The significant non-monotonic relationship between state shareholding and corporate
performance is therefore caused by the impacts derived from the equity stakes of the
government.  How does the government shareholder cause the U-shaped distribution
of corporate value under different sizes of state shareholding?
V. Interpretation and Further Findings
With the intention to guide future theoretical work, this section provides an
interpretation of this U-shaped finding.  The empirical evidences on employees￿
welfare, board-member turnovers and government subsidies support this
interpretation, to some extent.
A. The grabbing hand—political interference
Political interference tunnels out the wealth of the joint-stock company for the
usage of the government.  This damages the interests of other shareholders and theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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profitability of the firm.  As a result, it predicts that mixed enterprises should be
valued lower than private enterprises.  In the context of a joint stock company, the
possibility of political interference depends on the voting rights of the government
shareholder as other shareholders oppose the grabbing hand of the government
shareholder.  Political interference increases with the sizes of state shareholding.
This is consistent with the first part of the U-shape￿corporate value decreases with
state shareholding until a certain threshold.
However, at some point where the stake of the government shareholder is
sufficiently large, increased voting rights of the government shareholder stop
increasing the probability and magnitude of political interference.  Other things being
equal, it would expect that the influence of politicians on the firm where the
government shareholder owns 51% is the same as that on the firm where the
government owns 85%.  After the threshold of a controlling stake
35, the probability of
political interference reaches the maximum.  Furthermore, the government
shareholder has no rationale to tunnel more corporate wealth from the firms it holds
85% than from the firms it holds 51%, if these two firms are identical.  Otherwise, it
works against the financial interests of the government shareholder.  This implies that,
after a certain threshold, the magnitude of political interference stops increasing with
increased cash flow rights of the government shareholder.  Therefore, in terms of
political interference, corporate value decreases with increased state shareholding
under a certain threshold and then their continuous relationship becomes a constant.












 where V is
corporate value, B is the private benefits from political interference and a is theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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a θ , which partly explains why the
coefficient of State in equation numbered 3 is not significant.
B. A helping hand—corporate governance
The government shareholder can be helpful.  With its financial interests being
the cash flow rights of the company, the government shareholder may provide
corporate governance and prevent from managerial entrenchment.
Corporate governance is to control managerial agency cost under the
separation of ownership and management (Tian 1999).  Corporate governance is
costly, but it adds value to the firm.  If the voting rights of the government are small,
it is difficult for the government to control the manager.  More importantly, when the
cash flow rights are small, the government shareholder has low incentives to provide
the costly monitoring of the managers.  However, when the part of the increased
corporate value apportioning to the government shareholder overweigh the
monitoring cost, the government shareholder gets the incentive to provide corporate
governance.  This incentive increases with the sizes of shareholding stakes.  If
denoting  G  as the cost of corporate governance, there are



















C. A helping hand—government’s partiality
Regarding the incentives of corporate governance, there is not much
difference between the government shareholder and other shareholders.  The
particularity of the government shareholder is the capability to provide a wide range
of preferential treatment.  It includes biased regulations when the government is aWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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regulator, a preferential loan when the government is a creditor, a large order of
products when the government is a consumer or a discounted sale of production
factors when the government is a producer.
However, the partiality is not cost-free.  It is at the expense of the financial
interest or even political interest of the government.  Therefore, the government has
no incentives to provide the costly partiality in the firm where its cash flow rights are
small.   The allocation of partialities is correlated to the cash flow rights of the
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Regarding the government partiality, a large government shareholder is
helpful and corporate value will increase with the share stake of the government after
a certain threshold.
36
D. Synergy of the grabbing hand and the helping hands
Based on the behaviors of political predation, corporate governance and
preferential treatment, the utility function of the government shareholder is as follows.
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Thus the relationship between the share stakes of the government
shareholder
37 and corporate value is negative till a certain threshold and positive after
a threshold.   It explains the U-shaped finding.
The role of the government shareholder is the aggregated impact of its
different goals￿political interests and financial interests.  Its political interests of
tunneling and reallocation of resources are pursued with the detrimental political
interference.  Its financial interests that is cash flow rights in the firm are pursued with
the benevolent governance and partiality.  When it is a small shareholder, the
government does not provide corporate governance or preferential treatment, but
political intervention increases with the voting rights of the government shareholder.
This explains that the value of the firm is lower with a larger share stake of the
government until a certain threshold in Table VIII.  When the government becomes a
large shareholder, the government shareholder incrementally provides corporate
governance and preferential treatment and these improve corporate value, meanwhile
the magnitude of political predation stops increasing
38.   This interprets that the value
of firms decreases with a larger stake of government shareholding until a certain
threshold in Table VIII.
E. Empirical evidence
In order to empirically investigate the above interpretation, this paper makes
an attempt to directly examine the governmental behaviors.  However, due to the
limitation of my dataset, the proxies of political interference, state-based corporate
governance and government’s partiality are controversial.
The Chinese government under the control of the communist party is defined
itself as the representative of the workers.  The public choice school also suggests
that, as a special interest group, the labor unions influence the politicians.  Therefore,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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the government shareholder may encourage the managers to spend more on
employees’ welfare, which serves its political interest.  The accountancy item of
employees welfare is used to approximate the magnitude of political interference.
According to China￿s GAAP, this item mainly records the expenditure on medical and
health cares of the employees in the firm.  Government partiality is approximated by
the accountancy item of government subsidies.  This records the explicit subsidies
given by the government, including tax rebates.  I then use the frequency of board-
member turnovers to approximate the degree of managerial entrenchment problem
and therefore the quality of corporate governance.
Table X presents the results of the robusts estimation of the simple State form
and its piecewise forms
39.   It finds that the expenditure of employees’ welfare
increases with a larger share stake of the government before 50%.  After the 50%,  the
relationship between state shareholding rights and employee welfare is not significant.
The government has no incentive to increase the probability and magnitude of
political predation after this absolute controlling threshold.
After the threshold of 50%, the board-turnover significantly increases with
state shareholding.  This is consistent with the argument that corporate governance
gets strengthened when the financial interest of the government increases.   In the
range between 0% to 30% and 30% to 50%, it was notified that state shareholding is
not correlated to board turnover.   This finding is supportive in that the magnitude of
the managerial entrenchment problem is a negative function of the state shareholding
rights, when the government stays in absolute control.
When state shareholding is over 50%, there is a significant positive
relationship between the size of government subsidies and the sizes of the state
shareholding stakes.  When the government is a substantially large shareholder, theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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enterprises are given more subsidies.  The insignificant relationship when the
government is a small shareholder shows that the government is reluctant to subsidize
enterprises if its cash flow rights are low.
In summary, the U-shaped pattern is empirically based on the interaction of
political interference, corporate governance and government partiality.
VI. Conclusion
This paper examines the shareholding structure and the role of the government
shareholder with the firms listed on China’s stock market.  It shows that the
government is the largest shareholder of 43.9% of firms listed on China’s stock
market.  50% is taken as the threshold for the absolute control, the government
absolutely controls 31.4% Chinese PLCs.  This paper therefore suggests that state
shareholding is a main feature of Chinese firms and that hence the key to
understanding Chinese firms is through the role of the government shareholder.
Using a panel database of the firms traded on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges from 1994 to 1998, this paper finds that firms without state shareholding
perform significantly better than those with state shareholding, firms where a non-
government shareholder holds the largest stake perform better than those with the
government as the largest shareholder, and firms having a non-government majority
shareholder perform better than those having the government majority shareholder.
This implies that the overall impact of the government shareholder is detrimental for
corporate value.  Therefore, with the first large sample of mixed enterprises
40, this
study consolidates the literature on state ownership and corporate performance.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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However, the detrimental impact of state shareholding is not monotonic.  The
companies with higher voting rights of the government shareholder are not
necessarily always valued lower.  This paper finds a U-shaped relationship between
the sizes of the government equity holding and corporate value with a higher left end
than the right end.  When the government is a small shareholder, the relationship
between increased state shareholding and corporate performance is negative;
however, this relationship becomes positive when the government is a large
shareholder.  That is, the government shareholder is incrementally detrimental with a
small holding stake, but incrementally benevolent with a large holding stake.
This paper argues that this U-shape is caused by the behavior of the
government shareholder that is rooted in its cash flow rights and voting rights.  The
government shareholder maximizes its overall interests with political interference,
corporate governance and government partiality.  The grabbing hand induces a lower
corporate value with a larger stake of state shareholding before a certain threshold, but
the government also provides helping hands if its financial interests become
sufficiently large.  This interpretation gets supports from the available empirical
evidence.
This paper may have a certain policy implications.  If only corporate value is
taken into consideration, the finding of the overall detrimental impact of the
government shareholder supports privatization.  The U-shaped relationship between
state shareholding and corporate value suggests full privatization and one-shot sale of
state shares at the firm-level. Meanwhile, the optimal business strategy in acquiring
state shares is to buy out state shares at one shot.  The bidder of state shares should
request that the government fully retreat from the firm.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Documenting the features of China￿s PLCs, this paper proposes a new topic in
financial institutions as the role of the government shareholder.  This contributes to
the governance and ownership literature and intends to stimulate theoretical research.
Hart (1995) suggests that "analyzing public versus private ownership in incomplete
contracting terms￿ is a challenging but fascinating task for future research".  This
paper tries to take a new step.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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This table presents the market capitalization over Chinese GDP, number of shareholders of the listed companies, number of listed companies, stock market indexes, turnover
rates and price to earning ratios.   The period covers from 1992 to 1998.  The Chinese stock market is separated into Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenxhen Stock
Exchange.    The market capitalization and number of investors are the aggregated number from both the exchanges.  The data sources are from Shanghai Stock Exchange,
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and China Securities Regulation Commission. Capitalization  of Germany and UK equity markets are based on Bank of England, the factbook of
London Stock Exchange.  The  P/E ratio is from Bloomberg system.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998
China China Hong Kong Japan Germany UK USA(NYSE)
Market Cap over GDP (%) 3.9 10.2 7.9 5.9 14.5 23.4 24.5 198 72 32 165 -
Investors (millions) 2.2 7.8 10.6 12.4 23.1 33.3 39.1
Newly Listed Companies 39 130 108 32 207 215 106 32 57 68 233 228
Total Companies 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 680 1,890 741 2921 3114
Shanghai 29 106 171 188 293 383 438
Shenzhen 24 77 120 135 237 362 413
Composite Index 10048 13842 4845 5882 9181
Shanghai 780.4 833.8 647.9 555.3 917.0 1194.1 1146.7
Shenzhen 241.2 238.3 140.6 113.3 327.3 381.3 343.9
Trading Values (US $Billion) 8.21 44.19 97.94 48.63 257.05 370.14 283.67 206.15 750.83 945.06 2887.89 7317.95
Turnover Rate (times) 62 34 - 47 70
Shanghai - 341 787 396 591 326 297
Shenzhen - 213 472 180 902 466 283
P/E Ratio 11.1 155.1 34.8 23.1 22.0
Shanghai - 42.5 23.5 15.7 31.3 39.9 34.4




This table presents the simplified aggregated balance sheet for the public listed companies on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  It also presents the percentage of
each item over the book value of total asset.  The data on UK and Japan is the ratios of all firms from Rajan and Zingales (1995).
Accounting Items 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 UK Japan
Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Ratio Ratio
Current Asset 76.1 55.3 90.3 55.4 81.2 56.0 85.5 54.9 93.2 53.2 55 58
Fixed Asset 40.9 29.7 51.1 31.3 47.6 32.8 53.9 34.6 63.5 36.3 41 29
Other Asset 20.7 15.0 21.6 13.3 16.2 11.2 16.4 10.5 18.4 10.5 4 14.5
Total Asset 137.7 100.0 163 100.0 144.9 100 155.8 100.0 175.1 100.0 100 100
Short-term Liability 52.5 38.2 67.9 41.6 60 41.4 58.7 37.7 66.3 37.9 40 42
Long-term Liability 12.1 8.8 17 10.4 17.6 12.2 19 12.2 19.1 10.9 18 25




This table presents the official classification of common stock in Chinese public listed companies.  CSRC represents China Securities Regulatory Commission.  The numbers
in the cells are calculated as the ratio of the corresponding class of shares over total shares.  The first number is the cell is the mean, second in brackets is the standard
deviation, third the minimum and fourth the maximum.
CLASSES DESCRIPTION 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
State
shares
Shares obtained by an institution, as a representative of the central government, on behalf of the State in exchange
for the capital contribution made by the State.  The institution can be the central government itself, local
governments or wholly government-owned economic institutions.  State shares are not available for trading at the
























The legal person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions.  A legal person in China is defined as a non-
individual legal entity or institution.  The Commercial Banking Law of China, which came into effect in 1994,
prohibits commercial banks from underwriting, holding and trading shares.  Legal person shares are not tradable























The tradable A-shares are held and traded mostly by domestic individuals and some by domestic institutions.
There is no restriction on the number of shares traded, but it is required that tradable A-shares should account for
no less than 25% of total outstanding shares when a company makes its IPO.  There are the only shares allowed to























Employee shares are offered to workers and managers of a PLC, usually at a substantial discount.  Employee
shares are registered under the title of the labor union covering that company, which also represents shareholding
employees trying to exercise their rights.  After a holding period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with
CSRC to allow its employees to sell the shares in the open market, but the directors, supervisors and the general


























This group of shares includes B-shares on domestic stock exchanges, H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange and N-shares on the New York Stock Exchange.  B-shares are available exclusively to foreign investors
and some authorized domestic securities firms.  The B-shares market is separated from the A-share market, with
SHSE B-shares are denominated in US dollars and SZSE B-shares are in Hong Kong dollar.  H-shares and N-
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Table IV
Shareholding Structures of Chinese Quoted Firms
Panel A: Proportion of Companies with a Single Shareholding in Excess of 10%, 30% and 50%
This table summarizes the proportion of companies with a large shareholder.  Companies are partitioned into those that have one shareholder owning at least 10%, 30% and
50% of the voting equity and the cases as the largest shareholder, respectively.  It is based on the 1998 data for 826 companies.  The data regards of firms in Hong Kong and
Japan is from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000); UK and Germany from Faccio and Lang (2000).




Another Domestic Company 39.2 10.5 27.3 41.2 23.9 0.9 1.2 5.3
Trust, Securities and Other Financial Companies 10.9 0.8 2.5 4.4 7.1 32.6 10.4 38.5
Foreign 5.1 0.0 3.1 6.2 - - - -
Family 0.0 0.0 0 0 64.7 33.8 71.6 13.1
State 43.9 31.4 37.8 43.8 3.7 0.2 5.2 1.1
Others 0.8 0 3.8 2.4 0 6.3 7.2 0
Companies without a large shareholding greater
than 10%, 30%, 50%
57.2 25.4 2.1 0.6 26.2 4.40 42
Ratio of Cash Flow to Voting Rights 99.9 88.2 86.3 84.2 60.2
Panel B: Shareholding fractions of the largest 10 shareholders
This table summarizes the average shareholding fractions of the largest 10 shareholders under the category of mixed enterprises, no-state-shareholding enterprises, enterprises
with the government as the largest shareholder and enterprises with non-government as the largest shareholder.   It shows the concentration of shareholding in Chinese quoted
firms.  The data is 826 firms in 1998.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Mixed Enterprises 42.5 10.1 3.8 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
Private Enterprises 41.5 11.7 4.8 2.6 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
Enterprises with government as the largest shareholder 46.1 8.1 3.0 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
Enterprises with a non-government largest shareholder 40.1 12.3 5.0 2.7 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
Total 42.1 10.7 4.2 2.2 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Table V
Corporate Performance along the State Shareholding Spectrum
This table reports the number of firms, the average Q and the average ROA under the 10%-scaled percentile of the size of the state shareholding stakes from the 1994 to
1998.  State shareholding is calculated as the State-owned -shares as a percentage of  total common shares. ROA is calculated as net profit after tax over total assets.  Q is
calculated as the market value of equity and book value of debt over the asset value in order to approximate Tobin’s Q.   The table presents the mean values of Q and ROA.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State No of
Firms
Q ROA No of
Firms
Q ROA No of
Firms
Q ROA No of
Firms
Q ROA No of
Firms
Q ROA No of
Firms
Q ROA
08 0 2 . 6 7 7 0.084 53 1.973 0.054 116 2.779 0.055 216 3.290 0.065 313 2.977 0.051 778 2.935 0.059
0.1 15 2.004 0.073 15 1.764 0.040 22 2.551 0.033 30 3.166 0.041 39 2.943 0.030 121 2.665 0.040
0.2 9 1.757 0.050 11 1.491 0.044 18 2.721 0.039 29 2.863 0.048 35 2.889 0.034 102 2.601 0.041
0.3 17 1.741 0.058 24 1.456 0.042 53 2.312 0.046 64 2.539 0.050 70 2.452 0.022 228 2.286 0.040
0.4 37 1.646 0.077 44 1.485 0.053 61 2.559 0.059 78 2.811 0.051 81 2.631 0.041 301 2.374 0.053
0.5 37 1.848 0.059 54 1.586 0.038 64 2.486 0.050 77 2.869 0.058 79 2.528 0.040 311 2.360 0.048
0.6 28 1.937 0.066 45 1.790 0.056 77 2.747 0.060 87 2.728 0.049 82 2.543 0.036 319 2.483 0.051
0.7 34 2.549 0.070 38 1.694 0.050 67 2.673 0.057 88 2.908 0.063 70 2.651 0.043 297 2.598 0.056
0.8 25 1.818 0.069 22 1.644 0.047 34 2.890 0.052 44 3.045 0.068 53 2.825 0.054 178 2.604 0.059
0.9 5 2.623 0.053 51 . 7 9 8 0.055 52 . 7 4 3 0.046 62 . 4 4 6 0.069 42 . 0 9 9 0.037 25 2.356 0.054
Total 287 2.155 0.072 311 1.683 0.049 517 2.646 0.053 719 2.967 0.058 826 2.766 0.043 2,660 2.604 0.053William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Table VI





Q A proxy of Tobin’s Q as the adjusted market value of the firm.  It is calculated as
the market value of equity and book value of debt over book value of asset.
ROA A proxy of corporate accounting profitability.  It is calculated as the net profit
over total assets.
Private A dummy variable of ownership.  If the government is a shareholder of an
enterprise, it is 0; otherwise, as 1.
++
Prilarge A dummy variable of ownership.  If the government is the largest shareholder of
an enterprise, it is 0; otherwise, as 1.
++
State The cash flow rights of the government as well as approximately the voting rights
of the government.  It is calculated as the state-owned shares over total common
shares.
-U
Herfindhal An indicator of ownership concentration. Calculated as ∑ (Si^2)/10  where Si is




A dummy variable of ownership.  If there exists a non-government major
shareholder, it is 1; otherwise, 0.
++
Second A dummy variable of ownership.  If the second largest shareholder has more than
10% voting rights, it is 1; otherwise, 0.
+0
Manager Managerial shareholding.  It is calculated as the total shares held by senior
managers over the total common shares.
+ 0 for Q;
+ for ROA
Size Corporate size.  It is calculated as the log form of total assets as for Q and
Market-to-Book value; log form of sales as for ROA and other accounting profit
measures.
+ - for Q;
+ for ROA
Tangible An indicator of the asset structure or the capital intensity.  It is calculated as the
fixed assets over total assets.
--
Gear An indicator of the capital structure.  It is calculated as the total liability over the
book value of total assets.
+-
Age Firm age.  It is calculated as the existence years of the firm since they were
founded.
--
Exchange Stock exchange.  It is 1 if the firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; 0 if listed
on Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
? 0 for ROA:
+ for Q
Industry The industries that a firm mainly operates.  20 dummy variables as the firms
distributed in 21 industries.  It includes agriculture, chemical industry,
conglomerate, construction, electricity equipment, information technology,
electronics, finance, food & wine, machinery, metal, motor, papers, petrochem,
pharmacy, real estate, shopping and travel, textile, transport, utility and others.
The data of industrial classification is from China Security Daily.
Year Time effect.  4 dummy variables as the data in different years.  It covers year
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
46
Table VII
Compare the Value and Characteristics of Firms
This table presents other firm characteristics and compares them.  NSEs are the enterprises with no
state shareholding, which are also called private enterprises.  NSL are the firms whose largest
shareholder is not the state (Non-State Largest shareholder) and SL are the firms where the State is the
Largest shareholder.  NSmaj are the enterprises where a major shareholder is the non-government and
Smaj are the enterprises where the government holds more than 50%.  The comparison of means is
based on student t-statistics.  It is significantly different, except for the ROE.  Under the whole dataset
without ruling out outliers, the Mann-Whitney U test is used to compare the medians of the two
samples with the null hypothesis that median(ME)=median(NSE), if taking the MEs and NSEs as an
example.  The statistics is, for example,    nse
nsee nse
me nse nse S
n n








me nse me S
n n





.   It indicates whether there are significant difference by
asterisks against latter column of the compared variables; *** as p or z -value≤  1 %, ** p or z -value≤
5%, * p or z -value≤  10%.
Items NSEs MEs NSL SL NSmaj Smaj All
Q Mean 2.935 2.467*** 2.817 2.457*** 2.995 2.547*** 2.604
Median 2.547 2.197*** 2.450 2.190*** 2.603 2.303*** 2.291
ROA Mean 0.059 0.050*** 0.056 0.050*** 0.074 0.054*** 0.053
Median 0.063 0.054*** 0.063 0.054*** 0.074 0.056*** 0.058
SECOND Mean 0.276 0.385*** 0.199 0.465*** 0.324 0.870*** 0.199
Median 0 0*** 0 0*** 0 1*** 0.000
MANAGER Mean 0.00006 0.00004*** 0.00006 0.00004*** 0.0032 0.0008*** 0.00005
Median 0.00002 0.00001*** 0.00002 0.00001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.00001
SIZE Mean 8.470 8.555*** 8.471 8.571*** 8.563 8.676*** 8.530
Median 8.412 8.540*** 8.413 8.559*** 8.509 8.645 8.501
TANGIBLE Mean 0.248 0.246 0.247 0.246 0.248 0.251 0.246
Median 0.215 0.222 0.216 0.223 0.219 0.225 0.219
GEAR Mean 0.398 0.441*** 0.407 0.443*** 0.370 0.477*** 0.429
Median 0.393 0.440*** 0.400 0.448*** 0.373 0.459*** 0.424
AGE Mean 11.764 17.497*** 13.372 17.517*** 12.089 15.545** 15.820
Median 7 8*** 7 8*** 7 7 8
Observations 778 1882 1089 1571 348 1028 2660William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Table VIII
Corporate Value in Different Enterprises
This table reports the regressions of Q and ROA on whether the government is a shareholder and
whether the government is the largest shareholder with the 2660 firm-year observations.   Private is the
dummy variable that is 0 when the government is not a shareholder.   The firms with Private as 1 is the
so-called private enterprises, since they have no direct government shareholding.  Largest is the
dummy variable that is 0 when the government is the largest shareholder.  The firms with Largest as 0
are the firms controlled by the government. Both the robust pooled OLS regression (OLS) and the
maximum likelihood panel model regression (MLP) are performed.   OLS regressions report the R-
squared and F-statistics in the table.  MLP reports the log likelihood ratios and LR chi-squared in the
table.  Significance is the probability for the respective statistics to be significant. Standard deviations
are in the parenthesis. The asterisks behind the coefficient show the range of P-values: *** as p-value≤
1 %, ** p-value≤  5%, * p-value≤  10%.
In the analysis of categorized enterprises, the discriminant analyses and the logit analyses with the
artificial setting taking the types of the enterprises as success rates are performed.  It was achieved
similar results to these of the comparison statistics and dummy-variable regressions.  These tables are
therefore not reported.
QR O A
OLS MLP OLS MLP OLS MLP OLS MLP
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Private 0.242** 0.229*** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.077) (0.065) (0.003) (0.003)
Prilarge 0.172*** 0.161*** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.061) (0.060) (0.003) (0.002)
Second 0.114* 0.115* 0.087 0.080 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(0.063) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Manager 0.159 0.603 0.413 0.825 0.305*** 0.284** 0.310*** 0.288**
(1.883) (2.849) (1.868) (2.852) (0.069) (0.144) (0.070) (0.113)
Herfindhal 6.452*** 9.362*** 6.513*** 9.426*** 0.184*** 0.295*** 0.186*** 0.298***
(1.646) (2.034) (2.067) (2.033) (0.066) (0.090) (0.066) (0.091)
Size -0.583** -0.608*** -0.581*** -0.608*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.034***
(0.062) (0.070) (0.062) (0.070) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Tangible -0.496 -0.433 -0.493 -0.429 -0.025 -0.028 -0.025** -0.028
(0.227) (0.213) (0.226) (0.213) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Gear -1.702*** -1.424*** -1.721*** -1.434*** -0.164*** -0.154*** -0.164*** -0.154***
(0.355) (0.175) (0.360) (0.175) (0.025) (0.007) (0.025) (0.007)
Age -0.004*** -0.005 -0.005*** -0.005 -0.0002*** -0.0003* -0.0002*** -0.0003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exchange -0.178** -0.118 -0.177** -0.120 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.052) (0.069) (0.053) (0.070) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Year Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Constant 8.130*** 8.351*** 8.109*** 8.353*** -0.110*** -0.136*** -0.111*** -0.137***
(0.545) (0.627) (0.551) (0.629) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025)
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
R-squared 0.504 0.511 0.427 0.425
Log Likelihood -4357.9 -4360.6 4154.7 4154.5
F statistic 34.95 34.83 14.10 14.08
Chi2 statistics 410.29 402.94 772.32 771.82
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Table IX
Corporate Value and State Shareholding
This table reports the regressions of Q and ROA on the fraction of government shareholding with the
2660 firm-year observations.  State2 is the squared form of state shareholding (State).  Both the robust
pooled OLS regression (OLS) and the maximum likelihood random effect panel model regression
(MLP) are performed.   OLS regressions report the R-squared and F-statistics in the table.  MLP reports
the log likelihood ratios and LR chi-squared in the table. Significance is the probability for the
respected statistics to be significant.   Standard deviation are in the parenthesis. The asterisks behind
the coefficient show the range of P-values: *** as p-value≤  1 %, ** p-value≤  5%, * p-value≤  10%.
QR O A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS MLP OLS MLP OLS MLP OLS MLP
-------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
State -2.294*** -1.821*** -1.493*** -1.367*** -0.067*** -0.048*** -0.035** -0.039**
(0.349) (0.414) (0.335) (0.412) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
State2 2.813*** 2.213*** 2.562*** 2.318*** 0.087*** 0.059** 0.045** 0.048**
(0.444) (0.612) (0.412) (0.580) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024)
Second 0.205*** 0.188*** -0.005 -0.003
(0.078) (0.067) (0.003) (0.003)
Manager 1.211 1.475 0.314*** 0.298**
(1.793) (2.826) (0.080) (0.125)
Large Private 0.416** 0.426*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.189) (0.107) (0.005) (0.005)
Size -0.642*** -0.654*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.065) (0.070) (0.002) (0.001)
Tangible -0.524** -0.474** -0.029*** -0.033***
(0.224) (0.211) (0.009) (0.009)
Gear -1.661*** -1.389*** -0.168*** -0.160***
(0.359) (0.174) (0.027) (0.007)
Age -0.004*** -0.005** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exchange 0.158*** -0.102 -0.002 -0.001
(0.051) (0.069) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Year Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Constant 2.686*** 2.918*** 8.580*** 8.674*** 0.080*** 0.038*** -0.096*** -0.120***
(0.218) (0.233) (0.572) (0.621) (0.011) (0.010) (0.032) (0.027)
-------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
R-squared 0.123 0.228 0.067 0.293
Log Likelihood -4449.3 -4343.9 3879.2 3594.9
F statistic 27.08 34.63 8.24 12.68
Chi2 statistics 237.85 438.14 250.40 727.60
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Turning point 0.408 0.411 0.291 0.295 0.385 0.407 0.389 0.378William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Table X
Welfare Expenditure, Board Member Turnover, Subsidies and the Size of the State
Shareholding Stakes
This table regresses the expenditure for employee welfare, board members turnovers and income from
government￿s subsidies on state shareholding, respectively.  To prevent from the missing controlling
variables, it reports the results of panel-model estimation, based on the maximum log likelihood
random effect estimation. Significance is the probability that the respective statistics will be significant.
Standard deviations are in the parenthesis.  The asterisks behind the coefficient show the range of P-
values: *** as p-value≤  1 %, ** p-value≤  5%, * p-value≤  10%.
Welfare Board Turnover Subsidy
State03 0.219* -0.108 0.474
(0.145) (0.088) (0.521)
State35 0.903*** 0.260 -1.200
(0.369) (0.163) (0.976)
State50 0.212 0.256*** 1.394**
(0.296) (0.152) (0.785)
State 1.380* 0.181* -0.243
(0.088) (0.101) (0.582)
Second 0.044 0.038 0.045** 0.044** -0.094 -0.080
(0.037) (0.037) (0.018) (0.018) (0.099) (0.099)
Manager 0.012 0.012 -1.897*** -1.913*** 0.013 0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.702) (0.701) (0.069) (0.036)
Large Private 1.770 1.960 0.142* 1.399*
(1.659) (1.768) (0.082) (0.743)
Size 0.551*** 0.553*** -0.055*** -0.054*** 0.696*** 0.690***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.018) (0.017) (0.108) (0.108)
Age 0.002** 0.004* -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.005** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.001)
Previous Net Profit 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.348*** 0.345*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.124) (0.127) (0.005) (0.004)
Industry Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Year Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Constant -4.690*** -4.720*** 1.113*** 0.822*** -6.170*** -6.108***
(0.373) (0.375) (0.159) (0.160) (0.963) (0.963)
Observation 1256 1256 1801 1801 943 943
Log Likelihood -38533.9 -38535.4 -2547.6 -2546.5 -16776.5 -16777.7
Chi2 Statistics 298.88 295.91 243.08 243.28 195.87 193.52









Taiwan Economic Journal The leading data specialist company in
Taiwan and the major Chinese data
vendor to Reuters, Datastream etc.
Accountancy data after
IPO
Genius Inc. More than 80% Chinese investment
bankers and security analysts rely on
the data provided by this company.
State ownership Genius Inc.
Board of directors Taiwan Economic Journal
Large shareholders Beijing Hairong Inc. The major financial data specialist
company in Beijing.
Industrial classification China Securities Daily The leading newspaper on finance and
securities in China
Block transfer China Securities Daily
State-share transfer Securities Times A major newspaper on securities in
China
With regards to accountancy and ownership data, the validity of the data sets is crosschecked and
missing points were made up, based on annual reports form the website managed by the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange.  http://www.cninfo.com.cn/.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Appendix 2:
Shanghai State Asset Management System
This chart describes the organisational form of the Shanghai State Asset Management System.
The arrows represent the control, which can be implemented by nominating or appointing the
crucial official in this pyramid.  The state asset management system also covers state
shareholdings.  As a general rule, the agencies with direct control responsible for specific
public listed companies can be numerous, but this organisational chart shows the control of
the government and ultimately the communist party to these numerous agencies is tight.
State Shares
State Shares
Shanghai Municipal Government Mayor Central Government
State Asset Committee
Mayor + >30 Heads of Municipal Agencies
State Asset Operating Companies
(Holding Companies)
State Asset Group Companies
(Former Bureau)
Operating Entities Operating Entities
State Asset Management Office
Operating EntitiesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Appendix 3:
Reports of Regression Results of Control Variables
Besides documenting the impact of state shareholding, tables 8 and 9 also
show the impacts of other corporate characteristics on corporate value in China.
A. Ownership
This analysis provides supports to the arguments of Gomes and Novaes (1999)
that multiple large shareholders improve corporate value, but it creates costs as well.
The signs of Second are significantly positive when it is regressed with Q, but not
significant when regressing with ROA. Minority shareholders benefit from the
presence of multiple large shareholders, as it reduces the private benefits of control
and facilities takeovers.  The market values of the multiple large shareholders are
therefore high.  However, in corporate operations, the multiple shareholders prevent
from efficient decisions due to bargaining problems.  It offsets the value-added by
monitoring the tunneling behavior of the largest shareholder.   Therefore, the presence
of the multiple large shareholders does not significantly influence accounting profits.
It is also interesting to find that managerial ownership has no relation to Q, but
a positive impact on ROA.  During the IPO period, the shares sold to employees and
managers are priced at a significant discount.  The initial managerial holding depends
on the rationing of the discounted shares and the personal budget constraints of these
managers.  Furthermore, the law forbids the managers to trade their shares when they
are in office.  Thus the sizes of managerial shareholding stakes do not signal to the
market for the quality of the firms.  However, given that the shares compose a
significant part of the personal wealth of the managers, the managers may have more
incentive to maximize corporate profitability when their personal wealth is more
affiliated with corporate profits.  This bonding could explain why managerial holding
is positively correlated to ROA.  It is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976).
The spline forms of managerial holding were also tested.  However, there is not a non-
monotonic relation between managerial ownership and corporate value, which differs
from the findings in United States.  The reason for this is possibly that the Chinese
managers’ holdings are only 0.005% due to their personal budgets, well below the first
threshold of 5% identified by Morck et al (1988).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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The significant positive signs for the coefficient of the LargePrivate in Table
XIII suggest that the presence of a majority non-government shareholder improves
corporate value.  This is consistent with the convergence-of-interest hypothesis of the
large shareholder theory.  The significant positive Herfindhal index on corporate
value in Table XII also supports that concentration of shareholdings improves
corporate value.  It is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
B. Size
The signs for the coefficients of the size on Q are significantly negative.  It
was also found that it is negative with market-to-book value.  This implies that the
large enterprises tend to have a relatively low corporate value.  This result is
confirmed by Xu and Wang (1999) and Qi et al (2000).  However, when regressing
ROA on Size, it is found that the size impact is significantly positive.  It remains
significantly positive, if we use the log form of total asset.  This is consistent with
Hall and Weiss (1967).  This contradicting result may be due to the transitional
feature of China’s stock market and its enterprises.  The positive sign of size on ROA
shows that larger-sized firms are more profitable, which is consistent with the theory
of scales of economies.  However, the larger-sized firms are perhaps more difficult to
be restructured than the smaller-sized firms.  The net present values of the larger-sized
firms are therefore lower.
C. Tangibility
  The asset structure influences corporate value.   The firms with large
intangible assets are valued higher.
D. Leverage
This study does not support the theory of static tradeoff between tax shield and
costs of financial distress under relatively soft budget constraints.  It finds that higher
debts are associated with a lower corporate value in China.  This is actually true in
most countries, where the debts to asset ratios are negatively correlated with market-
to-book value and ROA (Rajan and Zingales 1995 and Booth et al 2000).  The
pecking order theory may interpret this stylized fact.  That is, only when the firms
have no internal financing resources will they resort to borrowing.  Capital structure is
the active choice of the firms.  This implies that the firms with high earnings have low
gearing ratios.  This causality issue complicates the models￿ specification.  However,
the results of the U-shaped pattern are robust￿actually, more significant￿when the
gearing ratios are removed from the regressions.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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E. Age
Firms￿ age has a negative impact on corporate value, which is consistent with
the predication.  The theory of path dependence suggests that old firms have more
entrenched problems.  This is reflected in lower profitability and market value.  In
addition, firms￿ age is highly correlated to listing time.  It also finds that the more
recently listed companies normally have higher profitability.
F. Stock  exchange
The signs of stock exchange dummy are marginally significantly negative for
the market-based Q in the OLS regressions, but not significant for ROA.  It implies
that, during 1994-1998, the investors favor Shenzhen Stock Exchange a bit more than
Shanghai.  Comparing the stock index between 1994 and 1998 (see Table I), it is
confirmed by the fact that the Shenzhen composite index rose 144.6%, but Shanghai
only 77.0%.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Endnotes
                                                          
1 Mixed enterprises are the firms with the ownership mixed government ownership with private
ownership.  That is, the PLCs with partial government shareholding in my sample.  The firms without
any government shareholding may be loosely termed as private enterprises.
2 For instance, analyzing the enterprises fully owned by the state (SOEs), Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
summarize theoretical literature and argue that state ownership is inefficient.  Surveying more than 61
papers, Meggingson and Netter (2000) conclude that ￿[the weight of empirical research] is now
decisively in favor of the proposition that privately-owned firms are more efficient and more profitable
than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms￿.
3 Morck et al. (1988) document the non-monotonic relationship between management ownership and
market value of the firm; McConnell and Servaes (1990) document the concave relationship between
insider ownership and Tobin￿s Q.  These studies actually take the ownership variables as being cross-
sectionally continuous and find the relationship between corporate value and the size of the
shareholding stakes of a certain type of owners in a large sample of firms.
4 There is no fundamental difference between two stock exchanges in legislation and regulations.
Separating the stock market into two stock exchanges aims at encouraging competition between them.
5 In 1994, the Company Law (1993) that formally legislates and governs the joint stock companies with
the Anglo-American featured corporate governance structures took effect.  In the same year, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission introduced a series of six rules called as Contents and Forms of The
Information Release by PLCs, which formatted the annual reports.  In 1999, a new version of company
Law based on the 1993 Company Law was stipulated.
6 Furthermore, due to regulations, the fund management companies are excluded the government
shareholder.
7 Otherwise, I would have had to use the share prices from the market of foreign investors, but the
market values may not be comparable, like the home bias problem.
8 The largest industrial quoted company, Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited, has total assets of
$2.7 billion, fixed asset $1.4 billion and income $1.26 billion.  The total assets of the smallest Chinese
PLC Xiamen Xiongzhen are only $14.3 million and income $4.4 million.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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9 The Chinese PLCs have a so-called supervisory board. The Chinese supervisory board is in charge of
supervising whether there are illegal behaviors of the managers and directors.  It has no rights to
interfere with corporate management and strategy.  This is fundamentally different from the
supervisory board in Germany.   These Chinese PLCs are actually featured with Anglo-American typed
governance structures.
10 LLS (1999) admit that the high proportion of state shareholding in their findings is due to the
selection of their sample only with the large sized companies.  Faccio and Lang (2000)￿s study is based
on most of firms listed on the stock exchanges of some western European countries.  Therefore, the
results of this study is compared with Faccio and Lang (2000).
11 Aggregating the shares of these atomisic individual shareholders is not much meaningful, as they
usually do not collaboratively exert their voting powers.
12 The weakest link concept (LLS 1999) is adopted here.  If company A holds 15% of company B and
company B holds 20% of company C, it takes that company A holds 15% of company C.
13 It reduces the difficulty to examine the impact of the government shareholder in the following
sections.
14 This is distinctly contrast to other countries (Claessens et al 2000 and Faccio and Lang 2000). LLS
(1999) admit that the high government shareholding in their report is due to the bias of sample
selection only with very large firms.
15 The LLS method does not trace the owners of unlisted firms.  My dataset does not allow me to
improve the LLS method.  That is, some of the domestic unlisted companies are disguised family
owners.  This bias is admitted, but it does not bias my study on the impact of government sharheolding
on corporate value.
16 A significant proportion of PLCs is under the control of another domestic company.  With the same
problem as that other researchers encountered, I could not trace down the ultimate shareholder of a
company unlisted on the stock market.  Thus, there is admittedly a bias to reveal the ultimate
shareholding structures under the methodology of LLS (1999); however, this bias only strengthens the
argument of this paper that the government shareholder in the China’s PLCs is highly influential.
17 It may be unnecessary to consider the pyramids or cross-shareholdings, because the intermediate
joint-stock company stands in the way of the influence of government officials. A joint-stock company
is not the government￿s agent and it has its corporate interest and business-oriented behaviors.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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Government indirect shareholding has different impacts from its direct holding.  More importantly,
technically, the traceable pyramids and cross-shareholding of the government shareholder is marginal
and around 1% changes of state shares does not change my empirical results.
18 It is the largest share stake of the government in the PLCs.
19 For instance, the study of Chung and Pruitt (1994) shows the explanatory power of simplified Q is at
least 96.6% of the Lindenberg and Ross (1981)’s Tobin’s Q.
20 LLS (1999) showed that relatively few of these firms around the world are widely held and the Berle
and Means￿ image of dispersed shareholding structure is not correct for these sampled countries, except
for the United States.  However, most shareholders still need delegate their control to the managers and
the separation of management rights and cash flow rights still exists.  The fundamental problem of
principal-agent can not be totally solved by a concentrated shareholding structure.
21 This argument is based on the intuition that the harmful effects of state intervention have a greater
impact under state ownership than under state regulation (Megginson and Netter 2000).  It is supported
by the fact that the partial ownership of state provides the access to insider information.
22 Moulton (1986) shows that the standard errors of the OLS estimation for the one-way error
component model with the unbalanced panel dataset are biased.  The GEE population-averaged panel
data models are used to check the robustness of the MLP models.  The results are very similar and the
tables of the GEE models are not presented here.
23 McConnell and Servaes (1990) employ the quadratic technique to show a hump-shaped relationship
between insider ownership and Tobin’s Q.  Morck et al (1988) use the piecewise regressions show the
non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value.
24 In addition, the tangibility ratio also helps to standardize for accounting artifacts (Demsetz and Lehn
1985).
25 Conventionally, tangibility is normally captured by using the R&D expense or advertising expense
data, but this information is not required to be disclosed under the Chinese accountancy standards for
PLCs.
26 No-State-shares Enterprises.  The abbreviation of NSEs is used, because the term of private
enterprises may confuse the enterprises without a government shareholder with the enterprises privately
owned by an individual.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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27 More importantly, it is the research approach of the mixed-enterprise literature (e.g. Boardman and
Vining 1989).
28 Although the law allows proxies of voting rights, proxy rights are seldom used in China.  The first
proxy war happened in 2000 when Tong Baihui collected proxies in order to control Shenli Gufen.
29 In addition, the highly significant Herfindhal index suggests that ownership concentration creates
value in Chinese firms.
30 The finding of Vining and Boardman (1990) includes the enterprises partly owned a fund as the
mixed enterprises.
31 Chen, Firth and Rui (2000) find that there isn￿t a significant improvement in value after share
privatization, which may be used to support the argument that state ownership is irrelevant to corporate
performance.  In contrast, finding the overall detrimental impact of state ownership, this study shows
that China is not an exception.
32 Starting from 2000, the government is in the discussion to redirect their target on selling the shares,
under the financial need to build the social security system.
33 "Measures on the Shareholding Experiment", issued by the State Council, 15 May 1992.
34 There are about one-third state-share transfer as the free grants in 1998 (China Security Daily 2000).
35 The actual controlling threshold varies on the specific shareholding structure of a company.
36 In addition, Eckel and Vermaelen (1986) propose an advantage of the government shareholder as the
internalized regulations.  They argue that the government does not impose rigid regulations on the firm,
if it can influence corporate strategy as a shareholder.  This proposal is less intuitive or convincing as
for the Chinese case.  Moreover, due to political interference and the on-going ownership restructuring,
Warren Buffett￿s committed high quality shareholder argument (1998) may not apply to the Chinese
government.
37 The simplified descriptive model here does not differentiate voting rights and cash flow rights,
because the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights in China is marginal.   With regard to the
analytical model, please refer to Tian (2000).
38 It also implies that the state-solely owned enterprises (SOEs) are theoretically better off than the
mixed enterprises, other things being equal.  However, in reality, the SOEs are not monitored by the
stock market and most of the Chinese SOEs have not built up the modern corporate governance
mechanisms yet.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 395
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39 The polynomial regressions have no significant signs for the independent variables.  50% is the point
for absolute control.  30% is also chosen in the piecewise regressions, because CSRC defines the
shareholder with more than 30% as stay in the relative control.  Technically, setting the range between
30% to 50% in my statistical investigations helps increase the significance.
40 This claim is based on the definition of mixed enterprises as where the government is a shareholder
but not the sole owner.DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
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